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NOTE
Constitutional Law-In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation-Denial of Jury Trial in Complex Litigation
The seventh amendment commands that "fi]n [s]uits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by

jury shall be preserved."' The recent move toward denying trial by jury in
complex litigation has sparked a significant controversy over the constitutionality of such denials.2 In its decision in In re Japanese Electronic Products
Antitrust Litigation,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

held that the jury trial right may be denied if a case is so complex a jury
cannot understand it. Finding that the fifth amendment right to due process
guarantees a rational factflinder and that an uncomprehending jury cannot
reach a reasoned decision, the court concluded that the more fundamental
guarantee of due process outweighs the jury trial guarantee of the seventh
amendment. 4 JapaneseProducts puts the Third Circuit at odds with the Ninth

Circuit, which has held that jury trial may not be denied because of mere
complexity. 5
In Zenith Radio Corporationv. MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo. ,6 sepa-

rate antitrust actions by National Union Electric Corporation (NUE) and
Zenith Radio Corporation against several Japanese electronics companies

were consolidated for trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The complaints alleged numerous violations of the antidumping and antitrust laws7 as
part of a pervasive conspiracy to destroy domestic competition in the American electronics market. Both plaintiffs demanded a jury trial. Fourteen of the

defendants moved to strike the demand, arguing that the case was too massive
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. See e.g., Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128-U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980); Devlin, JuryTrialofComplex Cases: English Practiceat
the Time ofthe Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 43 (1980); Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: ProtractedCommercialLitigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REv. 775
(1978); Note, The Right to a Jury Trialin Complex CivilLitigation, 92 HARV. L. Rav. 898 (1979);
Comment, The Right to Strike the Jury TrialDemandin Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMi L. Rv.
243 (1980); Best Brief, 1980 National Moot Court Competition, 56 CHL-KENT L. REv.911 (1980).
Even Chief Justice Warren Burger has advocated studying ways to limit or eliminate jury
trial in long, complex litigation. Remarks of Warren E. Burger to Meeting of Conference of State
Chief Justices (Aug. 7, 1979) (unpublished speech; copy on file in offices of N.C.L. REv.) (reported
at 48 U.S.L.W. 2118, 2118-19 (Aug. 14, 1979)).
3. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
4. Id at 1086.
5. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
929 (1980).
6. 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (memorandum and order of certification).
7. NUE asserted violations of the 1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976), the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976) (conspiracy to restrain trade), and the Wilson Tariff Act, 15
U.S.C. § 8 (1976) (applying Sherman Act to import trade). In addition to these violations Zenith
alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) (price-fixing), and the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (illegal acquisition of domestic competitors).

1264

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

and complex for a jury.8 The district court refused to strike the jury demand,
but certified an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit for immediate resolution of the jury trial issue.9
With its decision on appeal, 10 the Third Circuit has become the first
United States Court of Appeals to recognize a complexity exception to the
seventh amendment right to jury trial in civil cases. Chief Judge Seitz, writing
for the court, admitted that a private antitrust action involves legal issues
which normally merit a jury trial, as opposed to equitable issues which do

not. I1 The court ruled, however, that to allow an incompetent jury to decide a

case is a denial of the fifth amendment right to due process.12 In balancing the
fifth and seventh amendment guarantees, the court noted that a major purpose
of the jury trial guarantee is to act as a check on the arbitrary use of judicial
power. 13 Theoretically, the collective wisdom of a lay jury and the exchange
of viewpoints during deliberations lead to verdicts that reflect community values, not the capricious views of any individual. When a jury is unable to understand the evidence and the law, however, jury trial produces the type of
arbitrary and erroneous verdicts it was designed to prevent. 14 Consequently,
"the most reasonable accommodation between the requirements of the fifth
8. The trial court estimated that the trial would last more than one year. Nine years of
discovery had produced over 20,000,000 documents including approximately 100,000 pages of
deposition transcripts. 478 F. Supp. at 895. The court did not estimate how much of this evidence
would be introduced at trial. The trial court did conclude that "this case is at least as large and
complex as the others in which jury demands have been struck." Id. at 899.
9. Id at 942-46.
10. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
11. Id at 1079. See Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (jury trial
required in treble damage action under Sherman Act).
See generall, D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ReAEDIES § 2.6 (1973). Dobbs asserts
that the legal or equitable nature of an issue is determined primarily by the remedy sought. For
example, a suit for an injunction would be equitable because historically, only a court of equity
could-grant in personam orders whereas an action for damages would be legal because law courts
traditionally provided the damages remedy. Id at pp. 68-78. The United States Supreme Court
has continued, however, at least to pay lip service to the proposition that the nature of the substantive rights involved as well as the type of remedy afforded is a factor in characterizing the issue.
E.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974) (private action for damages for violation of
Civil Rights Act of 1968 is legal because it is analogous to common law tort actions and because
the damages remedy is essentially legal).
12. 631 F.2d at 1086.
13. Id at 1085. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: CiilJuries andthe Allocation ofJudcall'ower, 56 TEx. L. REv. 47, 58 (1977).
14. 631 F.2d at 1085. See, e.g., Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1974)
(jury trial denied in complex interpleader action because trial before judge more likely to produce
a just result). The court also reasoned that a jury that cannot understand a case does not serve
other functions for which we value the institution. For example, normally jury involvement legitimizes the legal decisionmaking process and makes the citizenry more willing to abide by the rules.
But decisions by an incompetent jury hardly help breed respect for the judicial process. Likewise,
an uncomprehending factfinder cannot effectively perform "jury equity" by adapting the application of laws to particular situations. 631 F.2d at 1085.
The JapaneseProducts court rejected the argument that no irrational jury verdict would be
allowed to stand since directed verdict and j.n.o.v. are available to overrule a decision no reasoning person could have reached. The court held that due process requires more than merely limiting the result to a given permissible range of results; rather, there must be some assurance that the
jury in fact reached the result through a rational process. Id at 1087-88.

1981]

JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX LITIGATION

1265

and seventh amendments [is] a denial ofjury trial when a jury will not be able
to perform its task of rational decisionmaking with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the relevant legal standards."' 5 The case was remanded to the district court for a specific finding on whether such complexity
was present in this case.
The JapaneseProducts court articulated three objective criteria for a trial
judge to consider in determining whether a case is too complex for a jury: (1)
the overall size of the suit as evidenced by the estimated length of trial, the
amount of evidence to be introduced, and the number of individual issues; (2)
the conceptual difficulty of the legal issues and facts, measured by the amount
of expert testimony required and the probable length of jury instructions; and
(3) the difficulty of segregating issues, as shown by the number of overlapping
claims relating to single transactions or items of proof.' 6 In order to protect
jury trial in all but the most complicated cases, the court indicated it will require any district court invoking the complexity exception to make explicit
findings on the degree of complexity.17
In the past American courts have used an historical test to determine
whether the seventh amendment guarantees the right to jury trial in a given
case. Because the amendment "preserved" the right to jury trial, courts generally looked to the rights that existed in 1791, the date of the amendment's
adoption.18 Consequently, the jury trial guarantee extended to cases that historically would have fallen under the jurisdiction of law courts, but not to
those which would have been in equity or admiralty. 19 But in 1959, in Beacon
Theatres,Inc. v. Westover,20 the United States Supreme Court abandoned this
static historical test. The Court noted that in 1791 the "cleanup doctrine"
would have allowed the chancellor to take jurisdiction over a legal claim
joined with an equitable claim. 2 1 The Court found that doctrine obsolete,
however, in light of the merger of law and equity under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus, a jury trial was required. 22 Shortly after its Beacon
Theatres decision, in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,23 the Court ruled that the
15. 631 F.2d at 1086. Judge Gibbons dissented arguing (1) that the issue was not ripe for
decision, (2) that a complexity exception gives a trial court virtually unreviewable discretion, and
(3) that a single judge probably is no better factfinder than a lay jury. Id at 1091-93 (Gibbons,
Cir. J., dissenting).
16. Id at 1088-89.
17. Id at 1089. Although the court says mandamus is available to review any jury denial,
id, the dissenting judge complained that an interlocutory appeal is not available by right. Id at
1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
18. E.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
19. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) (Under the amendment common law
means everything not under equity or admiralty jurisdiction). If a cause of action was unknown to
English common law in 1791, courts traditionally look to the closest historical analog in order to
categorize the action. E.g. Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961). See generally James,
Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
20. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
21. Under the cleanup doctrine, if a court of equity assumed jurisdiction over the case because it contained an equitable issue, then it would also decide the legal issues in the case in order
to avoid a multiplicity of suits. See D. DoBBs, supra note 11, § 2.7.
22. 359 U.S. at 509.
23. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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to each legal issue in a case
seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches
24
even if the case as a whole is equitable.
It is well established that an action under the antitrust or antidumping
laws is legal in nature.25 The remedy of treble damages is punitive, and punitive damages traditionally were available only in law courts. In addition, the
rights determined in an antitrust action are analogous to those adjudicated in a
common law tort claim, an action which would have received jury trial treatment even in 1791.26 Although it has been argued that it is solely the type of
27
remedy sought which determines the legal or equitable nature of an issue,
recent court decisions have continued to mention the nature
of the substantive
28
rights determined as a factor in the characterization.
In recent years, however, efforts have been made to eliminate jury trial in
extraordinarly complex antitrust, securities, and patent cases. 29 Opponents of
jury trial in these cases argue that if a jury cannot understand the facts and the
30
relevant law, the legal remedy is inadequate and equity jurisdiction attaches.
To support this argument, parties point to the historical bill for an accounting
which permitted the chancellor to take jurisdiction over an otherwise legal
claim when the accounts were too complicated for a jury to unravel. 3 1 Those
who oppose a general complexity exception argue that the exception for accountings was allowed not simply because the accounts were complex, but because the whole package of procedures in law courts provided an inadequate
remedy.3 2 The accountings exception to the right to jury trial, therefore,
should not be extended to other types of cases.
The Supreme Court offered some support for the inadequate legal remedy
argument in its famous and enigmatic footnote in Ross v. Bernard,33 in which
the Court stated that "the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the
24. Id at 473. For a discussion of the distinction between legal and equitable issues, see note
11 supra.
25. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
26. Specifically, antitrust violations do not involve confidential relationships, contractual relationships, or fiduciary relationships implied in law; the litigants usually are strangers. The violation alleged is interference with plaintiffs competitive business activities. An antitrust claim thus
resembles the common law cause of action for interference with contractual relationships.
27. See note 9 supra.
28. E.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974).
29. E.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) afj'dper cur/am, 636 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir. 1980); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation 420
F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
30. See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial, supra note 2, at 905-06. See generally H. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQurrY § 43 (2d ed. 1948).
31. See Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887).
32. For example, it is argued that several procedural advantages of equity courts, including
the power to compel discovery, the power to introduce written depositions into evidence, and the
power to fashion a broader range of remedies, allowed equity to take jurisdiction. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 919-20 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See James, supra
note 19, at 661-62.
33. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. '34
Although many commentators 35 and some federal district courts 3 6 have seized
on the third prong of the Ross test as justification for a complexity exception to
the seventh amendment, both the Ninth and Third Circuits have recently con-

sidered the issue, and have indicated that dictum in a footnote to a Supreme
Court opinion should not be interpreted as an announcement of a major
37
change in constitutional interpretation.
The newest argument supporting denial of jury trial relies on the fifth

amendment guarantee of due process. In short, the argument is that due pro-

cess requires a comprehending factfinder; 38 if a jury cannot understand the

evidence and the applicable law, it cannot reach a reasoned decision; therefore, the court must balance the seventh and fifth amendment guarantees.

Since a fair trial can be had without a jury39 but cannot be had with an incompetent factflinder, due process outweighs the seventh amendment in these

cases. 40 One commentator has suggested that the due process approach and
the Ross test are merely different formulations of the same principle. 4 ' According to this argument, taking jury limitations into account in defining a
legal issue precludes the danger of an incompetent factflnder and thereby
42
avoids any violation of due process.
A threshold question must be addressed before the JapaneseProducts rationale is examined: Is there any case so complex a jury cannot understand it?
A few courts and commentators believe that no such case exists.43 For exam34. Id
35. E.g., Comment, The Right to Strike the Jury TrialDemand,supra note 2; Note, The Right
to a Jury Trial, supra note 2.
36. E.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), af'dper curiam, 636 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir. 1980); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.RD. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420
F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
37. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1080 (3d Cir. 1980); In re
U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411,425 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
38. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d at 1084 n.14 and accompanying text.
39. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
40. This rationale is valid only when a case is so complex that it totally escapes the jury's
comprehension. If it is merely difficult, but not impossible, for a jury to understand the case, the
seventh amendment must prevail. Mere difficulty is not an adequate ground for overriding the
jury trial guarantee. Eg., United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472-73 (1906). In
Bitter Root the United States government brought suit against three companies for wrongfully
cutting timber from public lands. The Court determined that this was in essence a legal action in
trespass or trover and that mere difficulty in presenting the case to a jury did not justify the
assumption of jurisdiction by a court of equity. Id
See Comment, The Right to Strike the Jury TrialDemand,supra note 2, at 285-86; Best Brief,
supra note 2, at 932-37.
41. Note, The Right to a Jury Trial,supra note 2, at 911.
42. Id
43. See, eg., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 429-31 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Higginbotham, supra note 13, at 54-55 (1977). Judge Iigginbotham
(N.D. Texas) contends it is counsel's function to distill and organize a case so a jury can understand it. If an attorney understands the case, he should be able to present it to a jury in comprehensible form. Jury trial should not be denied litigants merely because of the poor preparation or
incompetence of counsel Id
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ple, in In re U.S. FinancialSecuritiesLitigation" the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit disputed the premise that any case could be so complex as to
escape the comprehension of a jury.45 A greater number of authorities, however, contend that a few complicated and highly technical matters may escape
an ordinary jury's comprehension. 6 The trial court's experience in ILC
PerpheralsLeasing Corp. v. IBM Corp.47 best supports the position that a case
may exceed a jury's abilities. In ILC Per4'herals the court gave the jury a
number of special interrogatories to focus the issues. The jury was unable to
answer many of them and a mistrial was declared. When questioned by the
judge, the jury foreman said: "If you can find a jury that's both a computer
technician, a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you
could have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about that."'4 8 At
least one commentator has suggested, nonetheless, that the ILC Perpherals
due to
jury was not incompetent to find the facts; it was just confused, perhaps 49
unclear instructions, about the means of applying the law to the facts.
The Japanese Products court accepted the proposition that some cases
may be too complex for a jury. The Third Circuit refused, however, to base its
decision on a characterization of the case as equitable and held that complexity was never a defining feature of equity. The majority admitted that equitable accountings sometimes were granted in complex cases, but noted that
accountings were ordered only when the case involved issues that made equity
jurisdiction otherwise appropriate.50 Furthermore, an accounting was made
only after a jury decided that a party should be subject to an accounting, much
like cases today in which a jury decides liability and accountants measure the
amount of damages. The court concluded that complexity alone never allowed equity to take an entire case from a law court.5 '
There is general disagreement among federal courts as to whether complexity alone was ever a ground for equity jurisdiction. In the instant case
Zenith and International Business Machines Corporation 5 2 each commis44. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
45. Id at 429-31.
46. E.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), af'dper curiam, 636 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir. 1980); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976). See
Note, Jury Trialsin Complex Litigation, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 751 (1979); Comment, The Right to
Strike the Jury Trial Demand, supra note 2; Burger, supra note 2, at 3-5 (1979).
47. 458 F. Sup. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), af'dper curiam, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).

48. Id at 447. The court concluded that despite diligent efforts, the jurors could not deal
with concepts such as "cross-elasticity of supply and demand, market share and market power,
reverse engineering, product interface manipulation, discriminatory pricing, barriers to entry, exclusionary leasing, entrepreneurial subsidiaries, subordinated debentures, stock options, modeling,
and etc." Id at 448.
49. Note, Preservingthe Right to Jury Trialin Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. Rnv. 99, 114

n.78 (1979).
50. For example, an accounting might be ordered when there was a fiduciary relationship
between the parties or when fraud was alleged. 631 F.2d at 1080.
51. 631 F.2d at 1083. The court noted that the only case to so hold was Clench v. Tomley, 21
Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603), and concluded that the case either was poorly reported or was an aberration. [d at 1082-83.
52. IBM appeared as amicus curiae.
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sioned exhaustive historical research of the right to jury trial in 1791.53 IBM
contended that in 1791 equity could have asserted jurisdiction on mere complexity grounds had a proper case presented itself, even though it may never
actually have done so. In effect, IBM argued that the chancellor had the
power to take a complex case away from the law courts; therefore, a complex
case may properly be characterized as equitable.5 4 The JapaneseProductsmajority rejected this potentiality approach with the statement that "[w]e see no
persuasive reason for incorporating into the seventh amendment the policies
and probable actions of the English chancellor of 1791." 55 The court, however, ignored the real point of the IBM argument. The basic issue is whether
"common law," as used in the seventh amendment, is to be considered a body
of cases frozen in 1791 or whether it is an evolving concept. 56 If the respective
57
jurisdictions of law and equity were in a continuous state of flux in 1791, it
makes sense now to read the seventh amendment broadly enough to incorporate this concept of adaptability in the term "common law." In short, it can be
argued convincingly that the language of the seventh amendment never compelled the historical test since it was the right to jury trial, not jury trial in its
1791 form, which was preserved.5 8 If in 1791, the province of common law
was subject to expansion and contraction, the courts should use the same flexibility in defining "suits at common law" today.
Rather than upset the established interpretation of the seventh amendment's scope, the JapaneseProducts court chose to deal with the complexity
problem by balancing the fifth and seventh amendments. The majority found
59
that the right to jury trial is secondary to the due process right to a fair trial,
although some historians would argue that nothing has been more fundamental to our system ofjustice than the right to jury trial. Logically, the guarantee
ofjury trial should be viewed as a means to the ultimate end of a fair trial. If
the jury cannot perform its functions, then there is no reason to preserve a
hollow institution at the expense of the ultimate goal of preserving fairness in
the judicial system.
The most apparent weakness in this due process argument is the court's
failure to investigate whether a judge could be an adequate factfinder when a
lay jury could not. The majority listed several inherent weaknesses of the jury
53. See Arnold, supra note 2 (from research commissioned by counsel for Zenith); Devlin,
supra note 2 (from research commissioned by IBM as amicus curiae opposing jury trial).
54. 631 F.2d at 1083.
55. Id
56. Charles Wolfram argues that common law was viewed by the framers as a "process characterized by occasional flexibility and capacity for growth in order to respond to changing social
pressures, rather than that of a fixed and immutable body of unchanging rules." Wolfram, The
ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv.639, 736 (1973). Although
Wolfram used this analysis to argue for the expansion of the right to jury trial, the theory supports
the abridgement of that right in certain cases.
57. Id at 738.
58. Id at 734-37. See, ag., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-94 (1943) (directed
verdict does not violate seventh amendment; all procedural incidents of 1791 jury trial need not be
preserved).
59. 631 F.2d at 1084-85.
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system that make the average jury less qualified to decide complex cases than
the average judge. First, the best qualified jurors frequently will be excused
from service in lengthy cases because they cannot miss several months of
work. Second, counsel for both sides often challenge the best educated potential jurors so that one juror will not dominate the others. Consequently, the
jury in a complex case is likely to be less well educated than normal and will
not represent a cross-section of the community. 60 Third, a lengthy trial severely disrupts the personal lives of jurors and makes them less effective. 6 1
Finally, a jury is likely to be confused by technical subject matters and by the
62
processes of civil litigation with which it is unfamiliar.

The majority believed that the presumption that a judge can cope with a
complex case is sound for several reasons. A long trial does not disrupt a
judge's personal life; presiding over trials is his profession. A judge's greater
familiarity with the processes of civil litigation better enables him to handle a
complex case. Furthermore, although the court says that it cannot presume a
judge will be more intelligent than a jury or more familiar with technical subject matter, 63 it may be that judges are, on the average, more intelligent than
jurors who sit in these cases because the most qualified individuals have been
excused from service. Finally, a judge may in fact be more familiar than most
jurors with technical business matters if he has dealt with them in previous
litigation.
The Japanese Products opinion emphasizes the judge's familiarity with
the law and with the juducial process in its determination that he is better
qualified than a jury to handle a complex case.64 It is not clear, however, that
a judge's knowledge of the judicial process is a relevant consideration when
the inquiry is the relative capacities of the judge and jury to understand the
facts of the case. A judge should be able to cure a jury's unfamiliarity with the
processes of the court with proper instructions. Similarly, a judge's familiarity
with certain technical matters may not indicate he has a superior factfinding
65
capacity. Since it is counsel's function to teach the jurors about the issues,
perhaps the courts should evaluate the capacity of the jurors to learn rather
than the present knowledge of individual jurors.
The Third Circuit's approach is flawed in that it allows the denial of jury
trial with no guarantee that a judge is better qualified to find the facts of the
case. The majority believes it is appropriate to presume the judge understands
60. Id at 1086. Of course a particular jury need not be a cross-section as long as the jury
pool is drawn without systematic exclusion of any identifiable group. Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976) (Declaration of Policy). Because of the
special economic and personal hardships posed by extended jury service, however, a jury in a long

trial is likely to have a disproportionate number of unemployed persons, housewives, retired citizens and the like. Comment, The Right to Strike the Jury TrialDemand,supra note 2, at 247.
61. 631 F.2d at 1086. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
465-69 (1978) (Appendix).
62. 631 F.2d at 1086. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 447-48 (N.D. Cal. 1978), ajf'dper curiam, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
63. 631 F.2d at 1087.
64. Id
65. See note 44 supra.
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the case since such understanding is necessary for him to rule on evidentiary
motions as well as motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. 66 The
JapaneseProducts court refused to consider the possibility that the case may
exceed the understanding of both judge and jury,67 which would necessitate
either acceptance of irrational decisionmaking or reorganization of our entire

judicial system. The court concluded that until the issue is properly raised,
"the best course to follow is to presume the judge's ability to decide a complex
case and to focus inquiry on the jury's ability." 68 Logically, however, the two
inquiries should be simultaneous. Due process should override the jury trial
guarantee only if it is shown that the judge has the ability to understand the
case, and the jury does not. 69 If both judge and jury cannot understand the
case, then jury trial should be retained because the seventh amendment requires it and because the jury at least brings to the task a sense of community
fairness.
The JapaneseProducts formulation of a due process complexity exception
is incomplete at best. One minor problem that may arise if a complexity exception is upheld concerns the scope of judicial review. Even though a writ of
mandamus will be available to any litigant denied a jury trial under this exception, the dissent predicts that trial court rulings on complexity will be virtually impossible to overturn since the standard of review will be abuse of
discretion.70 If trial judges do have virtually unreviewable discretion to deny
a trial by jury, then the complexity exception may swallow up the seventh
amendment rule. For example, there is no logical reason why the exception
could not apply to deny jury trial in complicated products liability and tax
cases as well as antitrust, securities, and patent matters. The due process rationale might even be used to eliminate jury trial in complex criminal antitrust
matters. As long as the trial judge says that he based his ruling on those factors listed by the majority, 7 1 an appellate court could hardly find an abuse of
72
discretion.
It is possible that courts will develop an alternative to the abuse of discretion standard because of the importance of a right to jury trial.73 Since courts
are especially sensitive to abrogations of the right to jury trial, an appellate
66. 631 F.2d at 1087.

67. Id
68. Id

69. The dissent in JapaneseProducts implicitly recognized the need for such a showing: "I
cannot conceive of a case in which ... a separate claim for relief. . . sufficiently comprehensible
to a trial judge to satisfy due process, would be too complex for trial to a jury. There may be such

a case, but it is inconceivable to me that it could be recognized as such in the absence of a trial
record." Id at 1092 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609
F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 929 (1980) (judge not a superior factfinder to

jury functioning collectively).
70. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
71. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
72. See Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1964) (mandamus is
appropriate to determine the appropriate factors the district court should consider, but an appel-

late court may not simply substitute its judgment on the same criteria for that of the trial court).
73. Compare La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249,257 (1957) (mandamus appropriate
because there was a clear abuse of discretion by trial court in denying jury trial) with Dairy
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court should be able to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court under
the doctrine of "constitutional fact."'74 The denial of jury trial under the due
process test should be so extraordinary that allowing broad review should not
burden appellate courts. Indeed, broad review on mandamus is essential since
an interlocutory appeal is not available by right. 75 In addition, an appeal after
final judgment probably would be fruitless if the only error were the questionable denial of jury trial. An appellate court might be reluctant to find error in
such a case and thereby waste a long and otherwise proper trial.76 Perhaps the
majority recognized the need for broad interlocutory review when it required
exception make specific findings as
that a trial judge invoking the complexity
77
to the degree of complexity in the case.
Another problem that the court failed to consider in JapaneseProducts is
the possibility that counsel, in order to avoid jury trial, may manufacture complexity. In pretrial conferences counsel might be able to inject factual issues
that are only tangentially relevant to the case. Also cumulative or largely irrelevant evidence might be produced, creating the illusion that the case is exceptionally large or difficult. Many attempts at obfuscation can be detected by
a good trial judge during trial. The decision to deny jury trial, however, must
be made before trial when a judge may be unable to evaluate adequately the
true complexity of the case. If after denying jury trial, a judge determined the
case was not overly complex, he might be reluctant to order a partial retrial
thus wasting the court time already spent on the case.
JapaneseProducts represents an overbroad attempt to cope with the complexity problem. The court does attempt to limit the exception to cases that
elude a jury's comprehension despite the appointment of special masters and
the use of other jury aids.78 But trial courts still will have substantial freedom
to determine whether a lay jury can cope with a case. It may be that normal
juries do not perform adequately in gargantuan cases. The first step, however,
should be to modify jury trial rather than eliminate it in such cases. Instead of
allowing a single judge to try a complex case, other less drastic remedies
should be used if a fair trial can be obtained thereby. For example, individual
claims could be severed and tried separately in order to simplify a complex
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,479-80 (1962) (mandamus should be used to correct erroneous
denial of jury trial).
In Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) the district court certified for
interlocutory appeal the question whether the denial ofjury trial constituted an abuse of discretion, apparently acting on the assumption that a finding of abuse of discretion was required on an
interlocutory appeal. Id at 71. Seegenerally 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRSsMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§§

3934-35 (1977).

74. The doctrine of constitutional fact provides for substitution ofjudgement review of factual determination upon which hinge certain constitutional rights. For example, an appellate
court can exercise de novo review of the "actual malice" finding required by New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in media libel cases. See generally Strong, The PersistentDoctrine
of "ConstitutionalFact," 46 N.C.L. REv.223 (1968).
75. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting); see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
76. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
77. Id at 1089.
78. Id
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case so that a lay jury could understand it. 79 Alternatively, special blue ribbon
juries could be assembled to try particularly difficult matters.8 0
One argument against the JapaneseProducts approach of giving the case
to the trial judge is that the complexity problem is largely the result of liberal
joinder of claims permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge
Gibbons, dissenting, argued that the Constitution does not provide for joinder
and consolidation but does specifically guarantee jury trial in suits at common
law, and thus the case must be simplified procedurally to its common law
form-a single claim against a single defendant-before a denial of jury trial
can be considered. Only if a single claim is too complex for a jury should the
due process complexity exception be invoked.8 1 Judge Gibbons acknowledges
that severance of claims will produce inefficiency in adjudication, but concludes that "the provisions of the Bill of Rights which limit the way in which
the federal courts2conduct their business are designed to promote values other
8
than efficiency."
Another alternative to normal jury trial is renewal of the use of special
juries to find facts in complex cases.8 3 In seventeenth century England juries
79. The lay jury's capacity might also be increased through other procedures such as allowing
jurors to take notes, view exhibits in the jury room, and ask questions of witnesses. The use of

special masters to aid jurors could also be expanded. Special interrogatories are often submitted
to the jury to focus the issues.
80. Use of a special jury is not unprecedented. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
Another proposal to get an expert factfinder is for Congress to create an administrative
agency to adjudicate complex cases. See Note, Jury Trials, supra note 46, at 771-73. Such an
administrative board could be made up of expert economists, businessmen, or professors who
understand the complexity of the case. Of course these board members would be employees of the
government and conceivably could become agents of government oppression. But litigants at least
would avoid the sometimes arbitrary and idiosyncratic judgments of a single judge. Furthermore,
appellate review of board decisions is a readily available safeguard since administrative findings
must be specific, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976) and since they can be overturned if not supported by
"substantial evidence". E.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 447 (1977). See Note,
Jury Trials, supra note 46, at 773 n.122.
Creation of such an agency may not be feasible, however. First, Congress would have to
make the politically unpopular move of creating a new federal bureaucracy. Second, a single
agency may not be sufficient because complex cases arise in several areas such as antitrust, securities, patent, products liability, and tax. Finally, because of sheer volume, such a board could not
deal with all cases of a given type. There should be some screening process to ensure that only the
large and complex cases go to the board. Again, to avoid jury trial and get before the board,
counsel might fabricate complexity; the pretrial screening process could be as difficult for the
agency as it is for the courts.
Some decisions indicate that Congress cannot constitutionally create an agency to adjudicate
claims that normally merit a jury trial. E.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). More
recent decisions have upheld nonjury administrative adjudications in cases in which the government sues to enforce public rights. Eg., Atlas Roofing Co. v, OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977).
More importantly, in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court held that
an SEC finding that a proxy statement was materially false and misleading should be given collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent private suit even though those issues otherwise would merit
jury trial, Id at 332 n.19. If in establishing the agency Congress provided for adequate appellate
review, and explained that the board is necessary to fill in gaps in the judicial system, then administrative factfinding in such cases might be constitutional.
81. 631 F.2d at 1091-92 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation,
609 F.2d 411, 428 n.58 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
82. 631 F.2d at 1091 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
83. See, ag., Devlin, supra note 2, at 80-83; Note, The Right to a Jury Trial,supra note 2, at
916-17.

1274

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

comprised of merchants sometimes were assembled to try cases dealing with
business matters. 84 Perhaps it would be possible to select a jury for a complex
case from a pool of businessmen or other individuals with expertise in the
matters at issue. Since these trials often last for months, however, these jurors
would have to be adequately paid or they might successfully claim that their
liberty or property is being taken without due process or just compensation.8 5
Although there are certain duties of citizenship that all citizens owe, perhaps
months of jury duty with minimal compensation is more than an individual
has bargained for in the social contract. What is more, businesses need to
have some assurance that their executives will not be periodically conscripted
for months of jury duty, thus causing major interruptions in their business
enterprises.
Increased use of special juries offers many of the advantages of normal
jury trial. Although the jury would not represent a cross-section of the community, some sense of community values would be involved. A special jury is
not likely to act as a tool of government oppression because special jurors are
not permanent government employees. Even if a normal jury is inadequate, a
special jury theoretically preserves most of the valuable jury functions. The
real question is whether a special jury is a workable alternative. Chief Justice
Burger has implied that it is not, because of the economic hardship imposed
on the jurors. 86 But perhaps if special juries were allowed only in the most
complex cases, then adequate fees could be paid to expert jurors without making the cost of justice prohibitive. Perhaps some of the costs of a special jury
could be assessed to the litigants demanding jury trial. In any event, these
compromise solutions should be explored thoroughly before courts give up on
the jury system altogether in complex litigation.
The JapaneseProducts opinion serves to validate nonjury trials whenever
a normal jury cannot understand the case. Appellate courts should be alert to
the possibility that the exception will be invoked too often and should exercise
de novo review of any denial. Furthermore, trial courts should exhaust all less
drastic remedies such as severance and the use of special jury aids before allowing trial before a single judge in a complex case. Finally, Congress should
anticipate a possible endorsement of the due process approach by the United
States Supreme Court and should provide a statutory alternative such as use of
a special jury in complex cases so that erosion of the seventh amendment right
to jury trial will be minimal.
CLYDE LOWELL BALL
84. See discussion in Thayer, The JuryandItsDevelopment, 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 300 (1892).
It has been argued that in the eighteenth century, either party to a case had a statutory right to a
special jury at bar and at assizes. Comment, he Right to Strike the Jury TralDemand,supra note

2, at 256.
85. See Burger, supra note 2, at 5 (1979). Of course this argument could be made by any
normal juror. The denial of the opportunity to earn money simply is more pronounced when the
juror earns larger amounts because of special training and ability.

86. Id In the eighteenth century adequate compensation for special jurors would not have
posed a severe problem since trials lasting weeks and months were unknown.

